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Welfare Report—1996 Style
Will We Sacrifice the "Safety Net"?
Robert Haveman
University of Wisconsin-Madison
Why is it that we have welfare reform on our plate again? In my 
opinion, the reasons are neither cost or program growth, nor any notion 
that we have a "welfare crisis," irrespective of what either President 
Clinton or House of Representatives Speaker Newt Gingrich say. 
Moreover, there are no new or startling revelations of waste and ineffi 
ciency.
In part, we got into this debate again because President Clinton 
started it. The fact is that every President since 1970 has had a welfare 
reform plan save George Bush. But this pushes the issue back a step. 
Why has every President felt a need to place this issue on the nation's 
agenda? In part, all observers agree that current income support policy 
contains bad incentives and gives the wrong messages to recipients; 
moreover, it has failed to reduce poverty.
For two decades now, we have seen antipoverty expenditures rising, 
but poverty has not been reduced. Under these conditions, it is difficult 
to argue that the strategy is working, especially when people are impa 
tient. Moreover, the system that we have in place now has visible 
adverse incentives and a bewildering, multi-program patchwork that 
leads to well-known examples of horizontal inequity—among states, 
between one- and two-parent families, and between the working and 
nonworking poor. It discourages work, encourages family breakup, and 
prohibits the accumulation of assets beyond a bare minimum.
However, beyond all of these reasons for why we are again 
enmeshed in this debate is a simple overriding fact. There now exists a 
fundamental gap between the objectives of welfare and related pro 
grams and the society's social and economic goals.
At their core, existing welfare programs seek to secure for the mar 
ket income poor a level of after-tax, or disposable, income that exceeds 
some minimum standard. They do this by distributing direct cash pay 
ments and providing essential goods.
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Citizens today, on the other hand, see something quite different from 
the simple need for income assistance when they think of the poor pop 
ulation. Contrary to when the welfare system was started, we now 
expect that able-bodied women with children should contribute to their 
own well-being through work. We have also come to believe that for 
able-bodied people, there should be some quid pro quo associated with 
the provision of income support. And, if those requiring help are not 
job-ready, some seem to believe in education and training, rather than 
direct cash support; others advocate temporary public help followed by 
a termination of assistance.
At an even more fundamental level than work behavior, nonpoor cit 
izens today expect minimum standards of civil behavior and responsi 
ble lifestyle decisions by those who receive public support. They are 
offended by dependency, teen out-of-wedlock births, homelessness, 
drug abuse and crime—all of which they see prevalent among the wel 
fare recipient population.
While the images may be colored by stereotypes and prejudice 
(these problems are also concentrated in the African-American and 
Hispanic populations), to a large slice of nonpoor Americans, many of 
those in the bottom tail of the distribution today are there because of 
irresponsible choices they have made: the choice to bear children out 
of wedlock as a teen, the choice not to complete high school, the deci 
sion to refuse minimum wage employment when it is available, the 
decision to abuse drugs and sell them, the willingness to run in gangs 
and to engage in crime and violence, often against other poor people. 
After all, the poor did not used to be like this. And while many may be 
willing to admit that economic and social factors, urban schools, and 
the barriers created by racial prejudice may make these choices a ratio 
nal response to the options available, they nevertheless seem to con 
clude that these socially costly and destructive outcomes are the result 
of choices encouraged by the welfare system.
If this characterization is true, the questions that people ask today 
about the current welfare system become more understandable. If 
recipients are able to engage in productive activity, why don't we 
require work as a condition of providing cash and in-kind assistance? 
If they are unable to break into regular jobs because of a lack of train 
ing or a lack of child care or health support, why don't we encourage 
them—or force them—to get whatever jobs they can so that they can
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accumulate the work experience necessary to advance? If they are hav 
ing additional children who can be supported only by taxpayer assis 
tance, or if they are working off the books, or drug-dealing when they 
should be learning, or opting not to marry in order to sustain public 
payments, or not requiring their kids to go to school, why should we 
simply provide support without attempting to change these behaviors? 
In short, changes in general social standards, changes in the charac 
teristics and behavior of the poor and welfare recipients, and changes 
in our expectations of them have created doubts about the wisdom of 
the welfare system as we know it.
Some Background on Poverty and Welfare Policy
Before getting into the specifics of the welfare reform debate, this 
section of the chapter presents some basic facts on poverty and wel 
fare. Table 1 provides an overview of antipoverty programs since 1970. 
The years in the table correspond to peaks in the business cycle (1989 
and 1992 are included for completeness).
The first two columns of the table show the number of persons with 
market incomes below the poverty line before and after cash transfers. 
Although not shown, in 1960, 39.9 million people (22.2 percent of the 
population) had after-cash transfer income below the poverty line. By 
1970, this number had fallen to 25.4 million (or 12.6 percent of the 
population). Some combination of economic expansion, demographic 
changes, increased coverage and generosity of the social security sys 
tem, and the War on Poverty/Great Society programs caused this 
improvement. Since 1973, however, the poverty population has 
increased sharply. The gain from 1979 to 1989 is particularly distress 
ing; the sustained period of economic growth from 1982 to 1990 failed 
to raise the economic position of the poorest among us. Contrary to 
earlier experience, this rising economic tide did not lift these boats, and 
as a result, the common belief in the antipoverty impacts of good mac- 
roeconomic performance has been shaken.
Columns 4 through 6 show federal expenditures on the largest cash 
or "near-cash" means-tested—or antipoverty—programs. Through 
these programs, the nation currently spends around 1 percent of GDP 
on families and individuals with incomes below the poverty line.
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SOURCE U.S. Congress (1993, pp 678, 867, 1058, 1312-13, 1609), U S Bureau of the Census (1993a, p. xvm); Council of Economic Advisors (1994,
table B-l, p 268, table B-59, p. 335)
NOTE. Benefits in millions of 1992 dollars.
a Includes administrative costs of the program in 1973.
b Includes state and federal benefits.
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The Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, 
commonly referred to as "welfare," is the largest antipoverty income 
support program directed at families with children. The overwhelming 
bulk of recipients are single mothers and their children. The real value 
of aggregate AFDC benefits peaked around 1973; over the next ten 
years, real AFDC expenditures fell by almost 20 percent. Over the 
same period, the number of persons in families with incomes below the 
poverty line increased by 54 percent. Real AFDC expenditures have 
edged up since 1983. About 14 million people receive AFDC benefits, 
and two-thirds of them are children. AFDC spending accounts for 
about 1 percent of the federal budget, and about 2-3 percent of the bud 
gets of most states.
The decline in AFDC benefits has been more than offset, in the 
aggregate, by a rapid increase in expenditures on the food stamp pro 
gram, the nation's only antipoverty program available to all of the poor. 
There has been modest growth in the combined value of AFDC and 
food stamps.
In addition to these cash or near-cash benefit programs, a number of 
additional federal programs have significant antipoverty components. 
These include the medicaid program, public housing or housing assis 
tance, and the Head Start program.
Finally, in the next to last column, information on the earned income 
tax credit (EITC) is shown. The EITC is a refundable tax credit on 
earned income directed primarily toward low-income workers with 
children. It is a major antipoverty program administered on the tax side 
of the budget. While its cost was about $12 billion in 1992, by 1996, 
the EITC is expected to be the largest cash or near-cash program 
directed toward low-income families with children.
This constellation of existing tax and transfer measures represents 
an important contribution to improving the lives of the nation's most 
disadvantaged and to reducing the incidence of pretax and pretransfer 
poverty. The full set of programs existing in 1991 removed from pov 
erty nearly 20 million of the 55 million pretax and pretransfer poor; 
without these programs, the nation would have had a poverty rate of 
21.8 percent, but with them in place the actual poverty rate was 14 per 
cent. Without the programs in place, it would have taken over $160 bil 
lion (in 1991 dollars) to close the poverty gap; with them, the 
remaining poverty gap stood at about $52 billion.
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This synopsis of poverty and welfare programs provides the neces 
sary background for any sensible discussion of reform. However, this 
discussion cannot ignore how the U.S. economy has been evolving 
over the past twenty years. The simple fact is that the erosion of labor 
market opportunities for people with low levels of education has 
placed an enormous strain on the nation's antipoverty programs.
The figures in table 2, which show median incomes of men and 
women by their level of educational attainment, reflect the serious 
increase in inequality in the American economy. More important, they 
show the deterioration at the bottom of the distribution, which has con 
tributed to the growing gap among the rich and the poor. In 1973, the 
median male with one to three years of high school had about $24,000 
in income (in 1989 dollars); by 1989 the median worker with the same 
level of education had only $14,439 in income. Note that while the fall 
in income has been enormous for those with little education—both 
male and female—it has been greater for men than for women. Even 
so, the income level of women remains well below that for men.
Table 2. Median Income of Persons 25 and Over, by Educational 
























































SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1990), for 1967-1983 figures, U S Bureau of the Census 
(1991); for 1989 figures.
I now want to consider the merits and implications of the two 
"reform" plans offered: the Clinton administration proposal and the 
proposal contained in the "Contract with America," which has served 
as the basis for the legislation passed by the Congress and signed into
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law by President Clinton in 1996. Though the currency of either plan is 
certainly open to question, both are likely to be important reference 
points over the next several years during which the new legislation will 
be implemented.
The Clinton Welfare Reform Proposal: Making Work Pay
It is into this maelstrom of political and economic pressures that the 
Clinton administration strode, promising to "end welfare as we know 
it." But exactly what is this plan, and how effective is it likely to be?
President Clinton's proposal was designed to "make work pay" 
through an expanded EITC, supplemented by child care assistance and 
job training. Indeed, a large step toward attaining this goal had already 
been taken by the time the President announced the remainder of his 
welfare reform plan. A major expansion of the earned income tax 
credit had been part of the 1993 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
(OBRA93). By 1998 the program is projected to cost $24.5 billion, $7 
billion of which is the result of the 1993 expansion. For taxpayers with 
incomes in the lower earnings range of the credit, the expanded EITC 
can be thought of as a well-targeted increase in the minimum wage, to 
$5.95 per hour for families with two or more children, from $4.25 an 
hour. The expanded credit will deliver benefits to more than six million 
working taxpayers with incomes below the poverty line, will close the 
poverty gap by $6.4 billion, and will raise the incomes of over one mil 
lion taxpayers to a level above the poverty line.
The proposal of the Clinton administration was also designed to 
make parents responsible, in part through child support enforcement 
and requiring women who give birth to establish paternity in the hospi 
tal. It would make recipients experience "Workfare"—including educa 
tion and training—through a signed contract between recipients and 
government. It would discourage teen motherhood, by forcing teen 
moms to either live with their parents or send the check to the parents. 
It would change the "culture" of the welfare office by transforming 
caseworkers from check writers to counselors assessing capabilities and 
work out a training/education plan designed to achieve independence.
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Finally, the Clinton proposal would force recipients to leave welfare 
after some point; "two years and out" is its most popular manifestation. 
Those able to work will be forced to operate in a world in which 
income support is a temporary and transitional "help," a mechanism 
designed to enable people to get their lives in sufficient order to live 
independently, relying on the returns from their own efforts. When the 
time limit for support has been reached, recipients will be turned out to 
find their own way in the world of work, assisted by child care subsi 
dies and, of course, health coverage as a part of the president's health 
care reform proposal; if they are unable to find work, the government 
will presumably guarantee them a low-paying public service job (or, in 
some descriptions of the program, subsidize the private sector for pro 
viding jobs). However, this provision would have applied only to 
young recipients—those born after 1971—and then only to those with 
children older than one year. And, recipients not able to find a private 
sector job would be allowed to keep their public service job indefi 
nitely—if they play by the rules, continue to search for a job, and not 
decline a job if it is offered.
The analytical support of this plan by administration spokespeople 
was consistent. They did want to change the expectations of the poor 
and establish a new norm. They did want to threaten the loss of bene 
fits, in part because of the change in expectations that will result. At the 
same time, they sought to make jobs and working more attractive 
through supplements, services, and training. Their presentations made 
it clear that they saw health care reform as prior to welfare reform.
How Does the Clinton Plan Stack Up?
How do these elements of the Clinton proposal fare, especially in 
light of our critique of current policy? First, in my view, the expansion 
of the EITC is an extremely important, effective measure; it increases 
the return to work for taxpayers with children and does so in a coherent 
manner within the structure of the personal income tax. It will reduce 
poverty, and it has the right incentives.
Increasing efforts to collect and assure child support and to routinize 
the collection system are also to be commended. However, those who
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have studied this possibility—and who are its biggest advocates—sug 
gest that no more than a marginal increment in the available income 
support will accrue to most mothers now on welfare.
The provision for time-limited welfare, training and education 
through workfare, child and health care assistance, and a guaranteed 
public service job are, in my view, dangerous territory. While changing 
the rules and benefit structure of welfare programs to minimize the 
rewards available for dysfunctional behavior is one thing, effectively 
canceling income support is quite another.
The fact is that most current recipients lack the basic capabilities to 
work themselves out of poverty on their own, even if they were to work 
full time, full year at the wage rate that their education, experience, and 
health characteristics would command. Take a look at table 3. Women 
recipients of AFDC are not a picture of job readiness. Nearly one-half 
of their children are less than five years of age, nearly one-half of them 
are high school dropouts, and less than 10 percent are working at all.
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SOURCE: Committee on Ways and Means, 1993 Green Book, pp 696-97.
a Percentage distribution among mothers whose educational attainment is known.
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Figure 1, taken from a recent study by Gary Burtless at the Brook- 
ings Institution, gives a sense of what these women would be able to 
earn if left on their own in the regular labor market. The bottom two 
lines show what former recipients have earned after leaving welfare. 
The top line is the most revealing one. It shows the amount of earnings 
of women with the capabilities of those who are now welfare recipi 
ents, if they were to work full time, full year. This level of earnings 
would leave the bulk of these families below the poverty line, even 
assuming that they could find such full-time jobs, and moreover it fails 
to recognize that the bulk of them have children who would require 
child care assistance were these mothers to work such hours.























SOURCE The Work Alternative, Nightengale and Haveman, eds , p 84, Washington, 
D C . Urban Institute Press (1995). Used with permission
While numerous training or welfare-to-work programs appear to 
pass a benefit-cost test, it is but a dream that the sort of training and 
remedial education that will be offered through "workfare" will make 
these people job-ready and economically independent. Moreover, the 
total costs of operating a reasonable public service jobs program are 
sufficiently high — in the neighborhood of $12,000 to $15,000 per
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worker per year—that current budgetary constraints insure that the 
demand for slots would far exceed the supply.
The "Contract with America"—Another Approach
Not long after the announcement of the Clinton plan, the midterm 
elections of 1994 were held, and both houses of Congress changed 
from being controlled by the Democrats to being controlled by the 
Republicans. The new majority party had run on a multipronged plat 
form, called the "Contract with America," which included a welfare 
reform proposal.
The Republican approach to welfare was quite different from any 
that had been suggested heretofore. Although its specifics became 
modified in the process of congressional debate, its basic approach 
remained constant. In particular, the congressional proposal would:
• Turn over to the states—in the form of "block grants"— the fund 
ing for welfare (AFDC) that the federal government had been pro 
viding (less some amount to reflect expected efficiencies) and 
allow the states to do whatever they wanted with poor people in 
their jurisdictions. Moreover, the amount handed over would be 
kept constant for five years. As a result of this, poor people in vari 
ous categories would no longer be entitled to support.
•Along with the "block grants," the federal government would 
impose a variety of constraints on how the states could use the 
money. In particular, they:
- could not provide benefits to teenaged nonmarried mothers.
- could not provide an increase in support to mothers who had 
another child.
- could not provide support to either legal or illegal immigrants, 
with a few exceptions.
- would deny benefits for life to any child who was born to an 
unmarried mother who gave birth while a recipient.
- would beef up child support enforcement, much along the lines 
of the Clinton proposal.
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- would impose a 60-month (or 5-year) cumulative limit on the 
time that recipients could secure support from the state program. 
Unlike the Clinton program, this limit would not be accompa 
nied by support for education, training, child care, or public jobs 
once the time limit was encountered.
-would cut back on funding for other programs helping low- 
income people, such as food stamps, medicaid, and Head Start, 
and would seek to scale back the EITC.
How Does the "Contract" Stack Up?
Clearly, this congressional approach begins from a quite different 
and far more harsh view of the safety net programs in place in this 
country designed to help the least well-off among us. While one might 
view this harsh stance as sending a lesson regarding self-sufficiency 
and responsibility to adults who are recipients, it will inevitably carry 
adverse consequences for their children. Moreover, because the bulk of 
the people who will be affected by these harsh measures are African- 
American or Hispanic, the impacts of these measures across racial 
boundaries, may be quite unequal.
A variety of other concerns are also relevant in assessing this 
approach. First, some of the specifics of the program appear to be 
based on simple ideology, apart from any research knowledge or facts. 
For example, there is simply no evidence that the current system, 
which increases support along with family size, has encouraged addi 
tional births among the recipient population. One would be hard 
pressed to find a reputable researcher advocating the opposite position. 
Second, the notion that there is substantial money that can be saved 
seems to rest on a hope, rather than evidence. There is simply no evi 
dence suggesting that efficiencies of the amount claimed are available 
to any new administrative procedure, whether state-based or not. Third, 
the constitutionality of the measures as they pertain to legal immigrants 
is an open question. These people, after all, are required to pay taxes, 
and are drafted into the nation's military when additional personnel are 
required. Finally, by failing to provide support for training, education, 
child care and job search—and by not requiring work-related efforts
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while receiving benefits, the "Contract" proposals seem weaker on 
work than does the Clinton plan.
This discussion leaves an overriding question regarding the longer 
term impact of the measures in the "Contract": What will happen to 
those recipients and their families who lose their benefits? While no 
one really knows, if I were pushed into a corner I would speculate that 
10 to 15 percent of them would make a successful transition into the 
world of work and become self-sufficient, but at a low level. Another 
70 percent or so would "cope"—they and their children would be 
severely disadvantaged, but they would adjust by combining house 
holds or moving in with relatives, or they would work some in inter 
mittent and informal jobs. They would be poorer and even less capable 
of nurturing their children, but we wouldn't be vividly confronted by 
their hardships. We would only see the effects on their children a 
decade or two down the road. The remainder—say, 10 to 15 percent of 
those losing benefits—would become truly destitute. The effects on 
them would be obvious; homelessness would be only the most visible 
effect. The stock of recipients who now face benefit cutoff because of a 
five-year rule is about 1 million; 10 to 15 percent of this number is 
about 100,000 to 150,000. On average, each of these recipients has two 
children; hence, we are considering 300,000 to 450,000 people who 
would be visibly destitute. Surely, some of these would find their way 
onto the rolls of the Supplemental Security Income program—at fed 
eral government expense—or into the foster care system, at state and 
local expense.
Yet, it is the basic approach of this stern "Contract with America" 
proposal that is reflected in the new legislation passed by Congress, 
and signed—albeit reluctantly—by President Clinton. While some of 
the "Contract's" harsh edges have been sanded down, the entitlement 
of welfare has been eroded, block grants to states provided, work man 
dated, and prohibitions on assistance to various groups imposed.
Is the Real Problem "The Welfare System," or Is It the Collapse 
of the Bottom End of the Labor Market?
Unless I am wrong, the most critical problem of both the Clinton 
proposal and the Contract with America is their common presumption
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that the least able groups of the nation's working-age population can be 
successfully coerced into that niche of the labor market that has per 
formed most poorly. As I have already noted, the low-wage sector is 
already struggling to absorb a large and growing flow of immigrants, 
both legal and illegal, as well as a rapid increase in female labor force 
participants, many of whom have few skills and little experience. If 
ever there was "swimming against the tide," this is it.
It is my strong judgment that these plans fail to address adequately 
the damper that the low end of the labor market places on opportunities 
for low-educated workers. The implicit assumption seems to be that the 
low-wage labor market can, without major dislocation, absorb up to 
two million additional low-skilled welfare recipients over the next few 
years. I have serious doubts that this is possible.
I would urge readers to note that there are interesting, high-potential 
policy ideas available for both increasing the private demand for low- 
skill labor and making these low-paying jobs more attractive. I am cha 
grined that neither the administration nor the Republican Congress has 
paid more attention to the potential of some of these options.
After all, numerous possibilities have been studied, and some have 
come away with rather high marks. One possibility would be a pro 
gram modeled after the New Jobs Tax Credit, a measure that we actu 
ally had in place in the 1970s. The NJTC offers a tax credit in the range 
of $4,000 to $7,000 to employers who increase their employment level 
over some base level in the previous year. Because the credit is a flat 
amount, it forms a higher percentage in the wage bill for less-skilled 
workers than for more highly paid workers. It tilts the hiring decision 
towards lowest-wage workers.
Observers are convinced that a nontrivial increase in job creation for 
low-skill workers can be generated through this arrangement at a rather 
low cost to the Treasury, especially if the program is taken seriously, 
and publicized and administered efficiently. I would note that I am 
referring here to a universal program and not to the targeted jobs tax 
credit program.
A second possibility, this time on the supply side of the market, 
would be a wage rate subsidy. This program would complement an 
expanded EITC and make work pay even more directly. In this plan, a 
target wage rate, assume, say $10 an hour, would be set. Any worker 
taking a job at less than this amount, say $6 an hour, would be subsi-
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dized at a rate equal to 50 percent of the difference between the actual 
wage of $6 and the $10 target. Take-home pay would be $8 in this 
example: the $6 per hour market wage and the $2 wage rate subsidy. 
The effect of the plan would be to simply and effectively give low- 
wage workers, all low-wage workers, a labor-market advantage. It 
would make regular private sector work at low wages more attractive 
than it is now. Again, a number of potential concerns would have to be 
worked out, and the effects of the measure on the overall level of the 
market wage would have to be monitored.
The combination of this pair of employment incentives would 
improve the operation of the low-skilled labor market by generating 
ongoing demand- and supply-side pressure for the creation of jobs for 
marginal workers at reasonable cost. As such, it would equalize 
employment opportunities. By targeting the additional employment on 
underutilized segments of the labor market, national income could be 
increased without significant inflationary pressure. The combination 
will fundamentally alter the wage structure in private labor markets, 
raising the take-home pay of low-skilled workers relative to those with 
more secure positions in the labor market. The cost of an employment 
subsidy arrangement such as this would be substantially lower than 
providing equivalent jobs through public service employment, and 
lower still than dealing with the aftermath of the drastic cutbacks envi 
sioned by the "Contract with America." Surely these suggestions 
should not be excluded from any serious national debate on poverty 
and poverty policy.
A Few Final Reflections
Let me conclude with a few final reflections on poverty and welfare 
in the United States today.
My first reflection is that welfare reform policy is no longer antipov- 
erty policy. No longer do observers emphasize that the ultimate goal of 
all of this activity is to make the lives of poor people better than they 
are now. Getting people to work is equated with making their lives bet 
ter; perhaps this might happen in the long run, but for sure, not in the 
short term.
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A second reflection concerns institutions that no longer work in 
American society, and difficulty of government in replacing them. I 
have been struck by the enormity of the task of replacing families, 
churches, and neighborhoods by government. I am struck by how diffi 
cult and expensive it is to bring a young person, a child, to a position in 
which "work will work." Perhaps there is a lesson in our own personal 
experience that would be of use to government. How do we do it for 
our kids? Well, first we give them lots of education with monitoring 
and advice and expectations and parental participation in schools. 
Then, when they finish their schooling, we support them for a time 
while they get their heads together. Sometimes they engage in job 
search, sometimes they ski, sometimes they travel. Following this, we 
actively and in a one-on-one relationship, help them with job search. 
We help them prepare a resume, we put them into touch with friends 
and acquaintances, we help them to prepare for job interviews—all so 
they can find their own special niche in the world of work. Finally, we 
often support them in moving to another location, often far from our 
home if that is where the best opportunity for them is.
The main lesson, I fear, is that doing this effectively is costly, very 
costly. There is simply no way to do it on the cheap. The realization of 
this truth makes more distressing our talk of making welfare recipients 
self-sufficient with a reform that will at the same time save resources 
devoted to low-income families and their children.
A third reflection also relates to changes in the institutions that sup 
port and nurture the young. Like many other social scientists, I too am 
distressed by the growing incidence of out-of-wedlock births. But I am 
no less distressed by the Draconian measures regarding it often advo 
cated by observers such as Charles Murray. There are, it seems to me, 
few good options here. There is moral suasion; there is denial of bene 
fits; there is the requirement that teen mothers stay with their parents, 
perhaps frequently in a relationship that neither parents nor children 
will find productive; or there is keeping going as we are. Nothing looks 
very good, yet doing nothing seems wrong as well. I am simply trou 
bled by what appears to be a near total lacunae concerning what appro 
priate and effective policy in this area might be.
In summary then, any cogent debate of welfare policy must begin 
with the recognition that a new economic, social, and ethical order is in 
place. This reality would seem to rule out certain options—such as a
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negative income tax—despite their theoretical and practical appeal. 
However, the mandating of work for millions of low-skilled people in a 
labor market environment in which relative demands and wage rates 
are falling seems unworkable, though consistent with the new reality. If 
this is ultimately what "welfare reform" is all about, an increase in 
poverty will be the result, and the next generation will experience all of 
the correlates of "growing up poor." If welfare reform reflecting this 
new reality takes the form of such work mandates, measures designed 
to improve the performance of the low-skill labor market would seem 
to be a necessary and natural complement.
